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Abstract 
We propose a signaling model in which investors are loss averse to reductions in dividends 
relative to the reference point set by prior dividends. Managers with strong but unobservable 
earnings separate themselves by paying high dividends and still retaining enough earnings to be 
likely to at least match the same dividend next period. The model matches several important 
features of the data, including equilibrium dividend policies that can follow a Lintner partial-
adjustment model; a modal dividend change of zero; a stronger market reaction to dividend cuts 
than dividend increases; and a signaling mechanism that does not involve public destruction of 
value, a notion that managers reject in surveys. We also find empirical support for some novel 
predictions.  
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I assume [the Lintner model] to be a behavioral model, not only 
from its form, but because no one has yet been able to derive it as 
the solution to a maximization problem, despite 30 years of trying. 
-- Merton Miller (1986, p. S467) 
 
I.  Introduction 
The first-order facts of dividend policy are agreed upon by executives as well as the data. 
A recent survey of 384 executives by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) found that 
they try to avoid reducing dividends per share (93.8% agreed); that they try to maintain a smooth 
dividend stream (89.6%); that they are reluctant to make changes that might have to be reversed 
(77.9%) because there are negative consequences to reducing dividends (88.1%) given that they 
convey information to investors (80%). The responses are consistent with Lintner’s (1956) own 
survey and interviews, his famous partial-adjustment model, and a large empirical literature.  
Yet the very strongest views expressed in the Brav et al. survey are reserved for 
mechanisms behind traditional theories of dividend signaling. Executives viewed these as 
broadly misguided. The notion that dividends are used to show that their firm can bear costs such 
as borrowing external funds or passing up investment was summarily rejected (4.4% agreement). 
The idea of signaling through costly taxes did not receive much more support (16.6%). These 
findings cast some doubt on the mechanisms driving signaling models by Bhattacharya (1979), 
Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), Kumar (1988), Bernheim (1991), and Allen, 
Bernardo, and Welch (2000), among others.  
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In this paper we use prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to build a 
signaling model of dividend policy with behavioral foundations. We focus on two features of the 
prospect theory value function: that values and perceptions are based on losses and gains relative 
to a reference point; and, that there is more disutility from losses than there is utility from equal-
size gains. Reference-dependence and loss aversion are supported by a considerable literature in 
psychology and a growing body of evidence from finance and economics, as we discuss later.  
The essence of the model is that investors evaluate current dividends against the 
reference point established by past dividends. Because investors are particularly disappointed 
when dividends are cut, dividends can credibly signal information about earnings. The model is 
inherently multiperiod, which leads to more natural explanations for the survey results above and 
other facts about dividend policy such as the Lintner partial-adjustment model, which emerges in 
equilibrium. The model also yields novel predictions, which we test.  
The model uses reference point preferences as the mechanism for costly signaling. The 
manager’s utility function reflects both a preference for a high stock price today and for avoiding 
a dividend cut in the future. In the first period, the manager inherits an exogenous reference level 
dividend, and receives private information about earnings. The manager must balance the desire 
to signal current earnings by paying higher dividends with the potential cost of not being able to 
meet or exceed a new and higher reference point through the combination of savings from the 
first period and second-period earnings. In equilibrium, managers that cannot meet the inherited 
dividend level pay out everything in the first period, as the marginal cost of missing the reference 
point is high; managers with intermediate first-period earnings pool to pay exactly the reference 
level dividend; and managers with very strong first-period earnings pay out only a fraction, 
 3 

raising the reference level for the future but, given their savings and average second-period 
earnings, to a level they are likely to be able to maintain.  
The model matches important facts about dividend policy. The modal dividend change is 
zero. For reasonable parameter values, firms with high or stable earnings engage in a Lintner 
partial-adjustment policy. Firms are punished more for dividend cuts than they are for symmetric 
raises, and so avoid raising the dividend to a level that will be difficult to sustain. And, notably, 
the model does not ask profitable firms to destroy fundamental value—burn money—in order to 
distinguish themselves. Its mechanism is not inconsistent with the survey evidence.  
Our model also makes some novel predictions. They revolve around the insight that a 
dividend that creates a reference point forms a powerful signal. Psychological evidence suggests 
that memory and salience play a role in the formation of reference points. This suggests that 
dividends per share will be concentrated in round numbers, which are more memorable and 
deviations from which are thus more noticeable. In contrast, standard models are continuous in 
the sense that they ascribe no particular role to round number dividends. Repetition of a 
particular dividend level also ingrains a reference point.  
Our results broadly support these novel predictions. Both dividend levels and changes are 
made in round numbers, e.g. multiples of five or ten cents. Managers that raise dividends strive 
to exceed round number thresholds. The market reacts asymmetrically when past levels are not 
reached versus when they are exceeded (a known result), especially when these changes cross a 
round number (a new result). As our model predicts, this asymmetry is more pronounced when 
the same dividend per share has been paid for more than four consecutive quarters. As a placebo 
test, we examine ADRs, where we find, not surprisingly, that the reference point and round 
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numbers are denominated in foreign currency. In this sample, there is no clustering and nothing 
special about the market’s reaction around zero dividend changes in U.S. dollars. 
Other papers have made connections between dividends and reference points or prospect 
theory. One that uses prospect theory even more heavily than we do is Shefrin and Statman 
(1984). They argue that dividends improve the utility of investors with prospect theory value 
functions if they also mentally account (Thaler (1999)) for dividends and capital gains and losses 
separately. Their theory is an important contribution but quite different from ours. Dividends 
serve no signaling function in their theory, do not follow a Lintner policy, and can be evaluated 
against a reference level of no dividend, for instance. Another important contribution is 
Lambrecht and Myers (2010). In their model, managers maximize the present value of the utility 
of rents that they can extract from profits. They smooth dividends because they have habit 
formation preferences and rents move in lockstep with dividends given the budget constraint. 
Lambrecht and Myers do, importantly, derive a Lintner policy in equilibrium, but there are a 
variety of differences with our theory and predictions. We discuss these papers and other related 
research. More generally, our paper adds to the literature on behavioral corporate finance 
surveyed by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007).  
Section II reviews the relevant literature on reference-dependent utility. Section III 
describes the model. Section IV discusses its compatibility with known facts of dividend policy. 
Section V tests novel predictions. Section VI concludes.  
 
II.  Background: Reference-Dependence and Reference Points 
In the time since Markowitz (1952) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed theories 
of choice based on utility that depends not only on the level of economic states, but on changes, 
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the literatures on empirical choice behavior and the psychological analysis of value have 
advanced considerably, as have their applications to economics and finance.  
A. Reference-Dependent Utility and Loss Aversion 
 We will focus on two central features of the prospect theory value function: that utility 
depends on changes in states relative to a reference point, and that losses bring more pain than 
symmetric gains bring pleasure. Our applications to dividends do not require a full review of 
prospect theory, which as a whole is a theory of choice under uncertainty.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) review the classic literature on loss aversion. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) introduced loss aversion to reflect then-known patterns in choice behavior. 
The subsequent literature suggests its relevance in a wide range of applications. One implication 
of loss aversion is what Thaler (1980) termed the endowment effect. Kahneman, Knetch, and 
Thaler (1990) found that the value of an item increases when it is considered already in one’s 
endowment. A literature has developed on differences between the willingness to pay for a small 
improvement versus willingness to accept a small loss, another reflection of loss aversion. 
(These literatures suggest the ballpark figure that losses matter slightly more than twice as much 
as gains.) Finally, a related phenomenon is the status quo bias. Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
(1988) documented a preference for the status quo even when costs of change are small relative 
to potential benefits, such as in choices about medical plans.  
B. Reference Points 
 If gains and losses matter, how are they defined? In other words, what is the reference 
point and how is it formed? Can it change? What determines its strength? Can there be multiple 
reference points?  
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The literature on prospect theory does not provide answers to these questions. The 
relevant reference point depends on the setting and, in static choice settings, is frequently 
unambiguous. For example, in the applications and experiments above, the reference point is 
obviously the decision maker’s current position. But in many circumstances, “current position” is 
not always so well defined. In Abel (1990), for example, the reference point for utility includes 
others’ current consumption levels.  
A more complicated situation arises when the decision maker has some control over the 
framing of an outcome. Thaler (1999) reviews the concept of mental accounting, in which the 
decision maker may, for example, choose to define reference points and segregate outcomes so 
as to strategically maximize his happiness under a prospect theory value function.  
Shefrin and Statman (1984) apply these ideas to explain why investors like dividends, 
although their perspective is very different. Shefrin and Statman argue that investors may prefer 
to mentally divide returns into capital gains and dividends and consider each separately. Their 
explanation employs a third feature of the prospect theory value function—its concavity in gains 
and convexity in losses. Dividends allow investors to flexibly repackage what would otherwise 
be a large capital loss into a slightly larger capital loss and a dividend. If the capital loss is large, 
then a slightly larger loss causes little extra pain, while the dividend can be accounted for as a 
gain relative to a reference point of no dividend and thus a return to the value function where 
marginal utility is high. Likewise, if there is a large positive return, making the capital gain 
slightly smaller does not decrease utility much, while the ability to treat the dividend as a 
separate gain allows for an additional, disproportionate utility increase.   
Reference points can also differ in their temporal character. In dynamic situations with 
uncertainty, the reference point is even harder to generalize about. It may involve the future, not 
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just the present. In Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2009), agents are loss averse over changes in 
beliefs about future outcomes such as consumption. Here, expectations about the future make up 
the reference point. For example, utility might depend in part on the prospect of a raise.  
Past circumstances can also supply powerful reference points. Genesove and Mayer 
(2001) find that people resist selling their homes below its purchase price. Shefrin and Statman 
(1985) find that the purchase price of a security serves as a reference point. Odean (1998) 
confirms this, and also suggests, like Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, and Lim (2008), that such 
reference points can change over time, albeit sluggishly. Baker and Xuan (2009) argue that the 
stock price that a new CEO inherits is an important reference point for raising new equity. The 
idea of one’s prior consumption as a reference point for the utility of current consumption is 
represented through internal habit formation preferences as in Constantinides (1990).  
In settings where the past supplies the reference point, its power may depend on the 
strength of the associated memory. Most of the literature does not incorporate the role of 
memory, however. A probability distribution is not memorable, and a rational expectation about 
the future is going to be continuous and somewhat indeterminate, which is unlikely to be 
memorable. The particulars of past consumption levels may not be memorable. In general, 
factors that increase the strength of a memory include repetition and rehearsal (Atkinson and 
Shiffrin (1968)), elaboration (Palmere et al. (1983)), distinctiveness (Eysenck and Eysenck 
(1980)), salience, associated effort (Tyler et al. (1979)), or emotional association. For individual 
numbers, ease of recall matters. Some phone companies sell phone numbers that include round 
numbers or several repeated digits at a premium.  
 A stock’s 52-week high provides an interesting example of a memorable number that, at 
least for some purposes, forms a reference point. The shareholder may have a positive 
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association with that level. It is a specific and salient number. It can be constant (repeated and 
rehearsed) for up to 52 weeks, but also varies over time. Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) find 
that employee exercise of stock options doubles when the stock price tops its 52-week high. 
Recent peak prices matter for the pricing and deal success in mergers and acquisitions (Baker, 
Pan, and Wurgler (2010)). Given that an individual shareholder’s purchase price also affects her 
trading behavior, this is also an example of how behavior and perceptions of value may depend 
on multiple reference points.  
C. Past Dividends as Reference Points 
 This discussion shows that theory alone cannot identify “the” reference point. The typical 
research process is to consider the setting, hypothesize the nature of the reference point(s), and 
then see if the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis. In this paper we hypothesize that past 
dividends are reference points against which current dividends are judged.  
 Our hypothesis touches on many of the concepts discussed above. The reference point we 
hypothesize is based on past experience, as in the disposition effect of Shefrin and Statman. It is 
also dynamic, as in internal habit formation. Fluctuations in the dividend upset expectations 
about future dividends. Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler (2007) find that many investors consume the 
full amount of their dividends, drawing attention further to their level. 
Dividends are also packaged to be memorable. They are announced at discrete and 
regular intervals, and often with some degree of ceremony and fanfare, which encourages the 
formation of memory. The same level is often repeated for many quarters in a row, further 
encouraging memory. We will show that they cluster at round numbers, and that changes are 
commonly in round-number intervals or designed to meet or exceed a round-number threshold. 
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The memorability of the dividend is central to our theory—it increases their power as reference 
points and, consequently, as signals.  
 
III.  A Model of Signaling With Dividends as Reference Points 
We present a simple dividend signaling model with reference dependence. The model 
uses nonstandard investor preferences, not willful destruction of firm value through investment 
distortions or taxes, to provide the costly signaling mechanism.  
There are two key ingredients in the model. First, a reference point appears in a 
representative investor’s objective function. In particular, there is a kink in utility, so that a $0.01 
drop in dividends just below the reference point is more painful than a $0.01 increase in 
dividends just above. Second, the manager cares about the current estimate of firm value as well 
as the long term welfare of shareholders. There are other details in the model, but these are the 
essential elements. 
Reference points shape dividend policy in several ways. On the one hand, to the extent 
that today’s dividend is the reference point against which future dividend payments will be 
judged, the manager would like to restrain current dividends, saving some resources for the next 
period to make up for a possible shortfall in future income. On the other hand, setting aside 
effects on future shareholder welfare, the manager would like to pay a dividend today that 
exceeds the current reference point. Moreover, because the manager also cares about the current 
estimate of firm value, he might also increase dividends beyond the current reference point to 
signal private information about the firm’s ability to pay. This sort of signaling mechanism only 
works because firms with limited resources are unwilling to incur the expected future costs of 
missing an endogenous reference point. 
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Similar results obtain if we replace reference dependent preferences with reference 
dependent behavior. For example, suppose investors sell their shares to risk-averse arbitrageurs 
with a probability that rises as the dividend falls below a reference point. The possibility of a 
dividend-induced dislocation in share price creates the same three incentives for managers: to 
restrain dividends to lower the hurdle for the future; to clear today’s reference point and avoid 
the associated share price hit; and to increase dividends and tomorrow’s reference point to signal 
firm quality. Such a model delivers additional predictions about volume, but otherwise adds 
complexity and is somewhat further removed from the psychology of reference dependence. 
A. Setup 
The model focuses on two periods: t = 1 and 2. There are two players: a benevolent 
manager and an investor with reference dependent preferences. In the first period, the investor 
arrives with an exogenous reference point for dividends d*. In some ways, this is a single 
snapshot in a multiperiod model. While the inherited reference point could in principle be 
endogenized, we believe the technical costs would be large compared to the benefits in extra 
realism or intuition. The manager also receives private information about cash earnings ε1 and 
pays a dividend d1 in the first period. This dividend forms a new reference point for the second, 
liquidating dividend d2. Today’s dividend d1 relative to d* tells the investor something about the 
manager’s private information and hence the value of the firm. In the second period, the manager 
simply pays d2. There is no discounting. 
Manager’s utility. The manager cares about what the investor thinks about ε1 today. He 
also cares about the investor’s long run utility. This objective function is in the spirit of classic 
signaling models like Leland and Pyle (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), or Stein (1989), which 
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use weighted averages of the dividend-adjusted stock market price and the investor’s long-run 
utility. Our simplified objective function is: 
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]*211 |,1 ddduEE im λελ −+ , (1) 
where d1 and d2 are the period specific dividends of the firm, u is the investor’s utility function, 
given an exogenous initial reference point of d*, and Em and Ei are the expectations operators for 
the manager and the investor, respectively.  
The usual argument for this general class of utility functions is that the adjusted stock 
price, separate from fundamentals, has a direct impact on the manager’s welfare through 
compensation or corporate control or an indirect impact through the interests of short-term 
investors. Rather than compute a stock price, we put the investor’s expectation of ε1 directly into 
the manager’s objective. This is an innocuous assumption, because in equilibrium the stock price 
will be a linear transformation of the expectation of ε1.  
Investor’s utility. The manager’s objective is standard. The interesting aspect of this 
signaling model is that the investor has a kink in his preferences for dividends d1 and d2. The first 
kink is around an exogenous reference point for first-period dividends d* and the second kink is 
around an endogenous reference point for second-period dividends: 
u d1,d2 | d
*( ) = d1 + b d1 − d *( ) d1 < d *{ }+ d2 + b d2 − d1( ) d2 < d1{ } . (2) 
Put simply, the investor cares about fundamental value, or total dividend payments, but 
with a twist. The level of the reference point comes from historical firm dividend policy, and b is 
greater than zero so that dividends below the reference point are more painful than symmetric 
dividends above the reference point. This utility function is in the spirit of prospect theory with a 
kink at a reference point. We leave out the complexity of curvature. The second-period reference 
point equals first-period dividends d1 by assumption. In reality, the reference point and the 
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intensity of the reference point b may be determined by a long history of levels and changes in 
dividend policy. The fact that each dividend payment forms a separate reference point also 
requires narrow framing. This is not a reference point applied to total ending wealth, but much 
more narrowly both across stocks and time, in the spirit of Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006). 
Figure 1 shows this utility function for d1 ranging from zero to four, d2 ranging from zero 
to two, a first-period reference point of d* equal to one, and a reference point intensity b of two. 
This means that decreases in the dividend relative to the reference point of d* in the first period 
or of d1 in the second period are three times as costly in utility as increases. The purpose here is 
simply to gain intuition about the utility function—there is no optimization here or savings from 
period to period. Think of these exogenously specified dividend payments as simply equal to 
cash earnings for the moment. Panel A shows utility as a function of dividend payments d1 and 
d2 and Panels B and C show the range of utility as functions of d1 and d2, respectively.  
In Panel B, the top of the range occurs when the second-period dividend of d2 is at its 
maximum of two. When the first-period dividend ranges from zero to two, the usual prospect 
theory kink is observable around the first-period reference point of d*, assumed to be equal to 
one. Also apparent is that higher first-period dividends can actually lower utility by increasing 
the second-period reference point. When the first-period dividend of exceeds the maximum 
second-period dividend of two, any further increase in the first-period dividend is more than 
offset by the cost of missing this reference point in the second period.  
The bottom of the range in Panel B occurs when the second-period dividend of d2 is at its 
minimum of zero. In this case, the losses of setting a higher reference point in the first period 
start right away, damping the slope between zero and one, and reversing it above one, after the 
first-period reference point of d* is met. Without any signaling motive, a benevolent manager 
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would save any resources above the first-period reference point, both to lower the reference point 
created for the second period and to save resources to meet this lower reference point in the 
event of low second-period earnings. 
In Panel C, the first-period reference point is still visible in overall utility, but there are a 
variety of ways that different second-period reference points can lead to equivalent utility levels. 
For example, paying no dividends in the first and second periods is equivalent to paying a first-
period dividend of two and no second-period dividend. Both lead to utility of -2. Hence, “folds” 
in the picture are apparent from this angle, even though, for a given first-period dividend, there is 
the usual utility kink at the reference point d1. 
Panel D shows the benefit of holding back any resources in the first period and the key 
ingredient for signaling firm quality, once the first-period reference point is met. Consider a firm 
with first period resources of 1.2. By paying only 1.0 and saving 0.2 for the second period, there 
are two effects. First the second-period reference point is lower. It occurs at 1.0 instead of 1.2. 
Second, the reference point can be met even if second-period cash earnings only come in at 0.8. 
The shortfall is made up with cash savings from the first period. The difference in utility from 
this dividend policy is shaded in the last Panel. Integrating over possible realizations in the 
second period, assuming they are uniformly distributed, leads to a quadratic cost in second-
period utility of increasing dividends in the first period, which we derive below in Eq. (6). 
Information. For simplicity, the manager has no control over the cash earnings of the 
firm. Note that this is a bit different from a traditional signaling model where the manager must 
destroy firm value to impress the capital markets. There is also no fundamental agency problem 
as there is in Lambrecht and Myers (2010). The manager is not able to keep the cash for himself, 
 14 

and no real value is created or destroyed with dividend policy. This is, at least in spirit, more 
consistent with what managers say in surveys about their dividend policy.  
The fundamental value of the firm appears in two installments, 
21 εε + . (3) 
Think of these as cash earnings that are not observable to the investor. This is obviously an 
extreme assumption of asymmetric information. It is worth noting the key elements of the 
assumption, which might each seem more reasonable. First, the manager must have some 
informational advantage in learning ε1 over the investor. Otherwise, there is no signaling 
problem. Second, the payment of the observable dividend must form the manager’s reference 
point, not the firm’s reported financials, such as earnings per share or cash balances. Otherwise, 
the manager has no lever to signal his information about ε1. For simplicity, we assume that the 
second-period cash earnings are have a uniform distribution, [ ]2,0~2 Uε .  
We have considered extensions of the model where the source of the information 
asymmetry is over ε2, a quantity that would not appear explicitly in any financial statements. 
This assumption produces similar results, although the effects of the budget constraint described 
in the next paragraph can change. The simpler model that we examine here has a mechanical link 
between type in terms of firm quality and current resources. 
Budget constraint. There is no new equity or debt available to finance the payment of 
dividends and no excess cash balances available in the first period. The most the manager can 
pay in the first period is ε1, and the most he can pay in the second period is ε2 plus any savings 
from the previous period. This leads to the following constraints: 
110 ε≤≤ d  and 1212 dd −+= εε . (4) 
These follow from the assumptions of no new financing and a benevolent manager. 
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B. Equilibrium 
There are three effects that appear in the manager’s objective function in Eq. (1). First, 
there is sometimes an advantage to paying out dividends immediately. Consider a first-period 
dividend below the reference point d*. Setting aside the effect on the second-period reference 
point, these dividends will be valued on the margin at b+1 times the payout, instead of simply the 
payout. This is a net benefit to investor utility in Eq. (2) of bd1.  Above d*, there is no marginal 
benefit from merely shifting payout from the second period forward. Second, by increasing the 
dividend today, the investor’s estimate Ei[ε1] of the unobservable cash earnings rises through an 
equilibrium set of beliefs that map dividend policy to cash earnings. This enters into the 
manager’s utility function directly in Eq. (1). Third, increasing the dividend in the first period, 
for either of these rationales, produces an expected future cost to investor utility that comes from 
the possibility of falling short of the reference point set for the second period. 
Substituting in the budget constraint from Eq. (4), and taking expectations over the 
[ ]2,0~2 Uε  distribution, leads to an expected cost conditional on today’s dividend of 
b d1 −
ε1
2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
, (5) 
provided the dividend d1 is more than half of cash earnings. Intuitively, there is no cost if the 
manager adopts a very conservative dividend policy of paying half of cash earnings. The 
expected cost is quadratic as dividends rise from this point and increasing in the intensity of the 
reference point. As discussed above, this comes from integrating over the shaded section in the 
Panel D of Figure 1. 
Combining the three motivations, the manager’s utility function from Eq. (1) simplifies to 
1−λ( )b d1 − d *( ) d1 < d *{ }+λEi ε1 | d1[ ]− 1−λ( )b d1 −
ε1
2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
d1 >
ε1
2
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
. (6) 
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The cost of falling short of the initial reference point is relevant only at low levels of first-period 
dividends, the signaling motive is present for all levels of dividends, and the expected cost of 
falling short of the new reference point is relevant only when first-period savings alone cannot 
cover it. Intuitively, given these considerations, there are potentially three ranges of dividend 
policies in equilibrium. There is a high payout ratio for firms with the extra motivation to clear 
the initial reference point of d*. Next, managers cluster at d* once this motivation drops out of 
Eq. (6). Finally, there is a lower payout ratio for firms well above the initial reference point, who 
nonetheless pay higher dividends to separate themselves from each other and from the pool at d*.  
 
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium where: d1 = ε1, for ε1 < d*; d1 = d*, for d* < ε1 < ε*; 
and d1 = 12 ε1 + λ1−λ ⋅ 1b , for ε1 > ε*. 
 
Rational expectations means that the investor believes: Ei[ε1 | d1] = d1 when  d1 < d*;  
Ei[ε1 | d1] = ( )**21 d+ε  when  d1 = d*; and Ei[ε1 | d1] = 2 d1 − λ1−λ ⋅ 1b( )  when  d1 > 12 ε *+ λ1−λ ⋅ 1b . 
Incentive compatibility requires a manager with ε1 < d* to be willing to pay d1 = ε1. This is not 
essential. There are other slightly more complicated and perhaps more realistic equilibria, where 
there is a discontinuous drop in dividends just to the left of d* as well as to the right. These 
equilibria also allow for lower levels of b. More importantly, a manager with ε1 = ε* must be 
indifferent between paying d* and paying 12 ε *+ λ1−λ ⋅ 1b . For this to hold, the signaling benefit of 
shifting the investor’s expectations from ( )**21 d+ε  to ε* must equal the cost differential of 
evaluating Eq. (5) at d* and at 12 ε *+ λ1−λ ⋅ 1b . Possible equilibria ε* are solutions to a quadratic 
equation: 
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λ 12 ε *−d *( )− 1−λ( )b λ1−λ ⋅ 1b( )
2 − d *− 12 ε *( )
2( ) = 0 . (7) 
There is no claim of uniqueness, so a sufficient proof of Proposition 1 is a numerical example. 
Example. Suppose the manager cares equally about stock price and utility, i.e. λ = 0.5.  If 
d* is 1 and b is 2.5, then Proposition 1 and Eq. (7) indicate that the equilibrium cutoff ε* is 1.6. 
For ε1 above 1.6, the first-period dividend is 4.0121 +ε . This exactly trades off the marginal 
signaling benefit per unit of dividends of 2.0, using investor beliefs implicit in Proposition 1, 
against the second-period marginal cost, i.e. the first derivative of Eq. (5), of 
( ) ( ) 0.24.055 1211 =⋅=−⋅ εd . For ε1 between 1.0 and 1.6, the first-period dividend is simply d*, 
or 1.0. At ε1 equal to 1.6, where there should be indifference, the signaling benefit of separating 
from this pool is 1.6 minus the average of ε* = 1.6 and d* = 1.0, which is 0.3. The cost from Eq. 
(5) is 2.5 ⋅ (0.42 – 0.22) = 0.3. This cost is decreasing in ε1, so there is no incentive for any of the 
managers clustered at d1 = 1.0 to raise the first-period dividend. For ε1 below 1.0, the first-period 
dividend is ε1. Here, the manager is limited by the budget constraint. The marginal first-period 
benefit per unit of dividends of 2.5 plus the marginal signaling benefit per unit of dividends of 
1.0, using investor beliefs implicit in Proposition 1, totals 3.5. This exceeds the second-period 
marginal cost just below d* of ( )5.015 −⋅  = 2.5.  So, dividends are at a corner solution of d1 = ε1 
from Eq. (4). 
The intuition is straightforward. There is a powerful incentive to try to reach the existing 
reference point of d* both to satisfy the kinked investor utility and to raise investor beliefs 
discontinuously from d* to ( )**21 d+ε . There is a steep rise in dividends per unit of cash 
earnings, or a 100% payout ratio, below the reference point. Then, there is clustering at d*. Even 
firms that could pay somewhat more choose not to, because of the costs of setting a high 
 18 

reference point for the second period. Eventually, there is a jump in dividends once cash earnings 
become sufficiently high. At that point, though, dividend policy is still relatively conservative, 
with managers saving a large fraction of dividends in reserve for the second period. In other 
words, there is a more gradual rise in dividends per unit of cash earnings. These patterns are 
shown in Panel A of Figure 2.  
Another way to see this is by plotting the histogram of dividend changes in Panels B and 
C of Figure 2. For this purpose, we assume that first-period cash earnings ε1 are normally 
distributed, with a mean of ( )**21 d+ε . There is a spike in the distribution at the reference point 
in Panel B. Moreover, even when we remove this spike in Panel C, there is still a jump in the 
distribution moving from the range just to the left of the reference point to the range just to the 
right. The distribution of dividend changes otherwise has a lower and longer tail of larger 
dividend cuts to the left of the reference point. 
Finally, we plot the market reaction to dividend announcements in Panel D of Figure 2. 
This is measured as the percentage change in expected utility in Eq. (1) from before the 
announcement. The interesting behavior is in the narrow range around the reference point. The 
drop in utility per unit of dividends is steeper to the left of the reference point than to the right. 
Missing the reference point by just a tiny amount leads to a drop of 12 ε *−d *( )  in the investor’s 
expectation. By contrast, it takes a discontinuous increase in dividends of 12 ε *+ λ1−λ ⋅ 1b − d *  to 
achieve the same size increase in investor expectations. As a result, there is a kink in the stock 
return chart at exactly the reference point of d*. 
Next, we turn to comparative statics. In particular, we are interested in how these patterns 
change with a change in the cost b of falling below the reference point. 
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Proposition 2. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 1, ε* and the market reaction to d1 < 
d* is increasing in b.  
 
Put another way, Proposition 2 says that there is more clustering of dividends at the reference 
point d* as the intensity of reference point preferences increases. As a result, the market reacts 
more negatively to a narrow miss. More information is revealed. 
Again, we show this by example in Figure 3. The comparison is between b equal to 2.1 
and b equal to 2.3. The exact magnitude of b is not important. If 2.1 seems uncomfortably high, 
it is worth noting that a similar equilibrium can be sustained at higher d* and lower b; we have 
been using parameters that make for clear pictures. Because we have no prior on the level of the 
reference point, this confirms that the assumptions required to support equilibrium here are not 
unreasonable ones. In each case, we recenter the ex ante distribution of ε1 at a mean of 
( )**21 d+ε  and repeat the plots from Figure 2. Note the implications of a higher b and hence ε *. 
There is more clustering and a larger spike in the distribution of dividend changes at the 
reference point d*. The market reaction is more negative when dividends fall just short of the 
reference point, the market reaction is flatter above the reference point, so that the kink at zero in 
the market reaction is more pronounced. 
 
IV.  The Model and Prior Evidence 
Dividend policy is an area so awash with empirical facts that any new model could be 
assessed almost as much on its ability to fit those facts as on the success of its novel predictions. 
We consider several stylized facts here in light of the model. While it certainly cannot explain all 
of the facts, a model of signaling with reference points appears to capture many of them at least 
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as well as existing approaches, of which the best known are Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and 
Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), Kumar (1988), Bernheim (1991), and Allen, Bernardo, 
and Welch (2000). Our model may also perform as well in some respects as theories based on 
agency problems, catering motives, or clientele effects, although to keep the discussion 
manageable we will not make such comparisons.  
A. Surveys 
Dividend policy is an explicit choice of executives (more precisely, the board). The 
proposition that their behavior may be guided not by their own hands but by an unseen higher 
market force, and therefore survey evidence should be disregarded, is inappropriate here. We 
therefore view the fact that our model is consistent with what managers say about dividend 
policy as an important success.  
The strongest results fit nicely with the reference point setup. For example, as noted in 
the Introduction, the Brav et al. (2005) survey of 384 executives revealed strong agreement that 
shareholders will react negatively to cuts in the dividend, whereas the reward for increases is 
modest. Executives believe that dividends convey information. As a result, they strive to keep a 
stable dividend policy. These are straightforward predictions of the model. It is intrinsically 
dynamic and the stability of dividends is a central feature. Once a reference point is established, 
even weak firms will strive to minimize the difference between it and current dividends.  
While standard signaling theories also predict that lower dividends are associated with 
lower market values, executives reject them as based on unrealistic foundations. As noted in the 
Introduction, executives say that they do not use dividends to show that their firm can withstand 
the costs and scrutiny associated with raising external capital, or to show that their firm can pass 
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up good projects and still perform well. Only a small minority of executives endorsed signaling 
through taxes; Brav et al. summarize taxes as of “second-order importance” (p. 521).  
Brav et al. followed up on their survey with in-depth interviews of 23 executives. They 
noted that “not a single interviewed executive told us that his or her firm had ever thought of 
increasing payout as a costly means of separating itself from competitors” (pp. 522-523). Note 
that our model doesn’t rely on voluntary destruction of value or real economic cost to create the 
opportunity for a credible signal. Although the mechanisms and assumptions behind our own 
model were not explicitly assessed in the Brav et al. survey, it is hard to imagine they would 
receive less support than this. 
Finally, it is notable that standard signaling theories do not naturally focus on dividends 
per share. Moreover, standard signaling theories predict a continuous market reaction. There is 
nothing special about stability or the historical level of payouts, such that falling short of this 
level would produce a discontinuous reaction. Dividend policy is defined in more “economic” 
terms in standard models, such as dividend yield or payout ratio, which are less salient to the 
average investor. Dividend policy measured in these units would not make natural reference 
points, however, perhaps explaining why stability of the level of dividends per share is the most 
common target. We will return to the salience of dividends per share in our own empirical tests.  
B. Dividend Policy and the Lintner Model 
As Miller (1986) hypothesized, the Lintner (1956) model can be given behavioral 
foundations. Given reasonable parameter values, our model predicts that dividends follow a 
partial-adjustment policy and are, more generally, smoothed relative to earnings (Fama and 
Babiak (1968)).  
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In particular, the Lintner model takes last period’s dividend as the reference level against 
which current dividends are determined. In our model, firms confident of being able to sustain 
high dividends will adopt a policy in which they pay out slightly above half of current earnings 
(exactly half in the case of extreme reference point preferences). They adopt this payout ratio 
because they do not want to set a reference level that may be too high for themselves next period, 
but do wish to separate themselves from a pool of firms with intermediate prospects which keep 
dividends extremely smooth—indeed, constant. On average, dividends are increasing in earnings 
but less than one-for-one, and all firms are focused on changes relative to the reference level set 
by lagged dividends. As an empirical matter, all of this adds up to Lintner-like predictions.   
The models of Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and Williams 
(1985) are static and focus on levels, not changes. The model of Allen, Bernardo, and Welch 
(2000) is also presented in terms of levels, though they outline a possible multiperiod extension 
that would be compatible with smoothing. The model of Kumar (1988) leads to smoothing to the 
extent that firm productivity does not vary much over time. Lambrecht and Myers (2010)’s 
model is highly compatible with the Lintner model and smoothing. It is not a signaling model so 
we do not include it in our horse race. It has many appealing features; on the other hand, it seems 
unrealistic that thousands of large, established, public U.S. firms smooth their payouts because a 
coalition of habit-formation managers prefer to smooth out their stealing. The required 
magnitude of rent extraction alone could be too great.  
C. Announcement Effects 
Even if executives disavow standard signaling models, it is clear that shareholders care 
about dividends. Aharony and Swary (1980) examine cases in which dividend announcements 
occur separately from earnings announcements. The average cumulative abnormal return in a 21-
 23 

day window surrounding a dividend decrease was on the order of five percentage points. The 
average cumulative abnormal return surrounding a dividend increase was closer to one 
percentage point. See also Charest (1978) and subsequent papers.  
That dividend cuts would be received especially poorly is a direct prediction of the 
model. The main effect is that cutting a dividend, even slightly, is fully revealing and betrays the 
firm as one that cannot afford even that reference level dividend. In any case, none of the 
standard signaling models offers a direct explanation for the asymmetry in announcement 
effects. We would suggest that signaling with dividends as reference points explains the 
empirical facts reviewed here as well as or better than standard signaling models.  
 
V.  New Predictions and Tests   
The power of dividends as a signal is directly proportional to their use as reference 
points. Firms that wish to signal in the manner of our model will not hide their dividend, 
especially when it is not a decrease. Firms in our model will design dividends to be as salient and 
easy to recall as possible. The novel predictions of our model are based on these principles.  
By contrast, standard signaling theories feature highly sophisticated investors who can 
solve complicated signal extraction problems; the least of their troubles would be remembering 
that last period’s dividend was $0.1323811 per share. Indeed, for static one-period models, there 
is no need for investors to remember anything.  
A. Salience, Ease of Recall, and Repetition  
What makes a number like dividends per share memorable? As noted earlier, round 
numbers are easier to remember. Quarterly repetition of the same dividend helps as well. In our 
main sample of U.S. dividend payers, we examine whether dividends and dividend changes 
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concentrate on round numbers, whether the use of salient numbers affects how the market reacts 
to dividend changes, and whether repetition increases the strength of a particular dividend level 
as a reference point as measured by the market reaction to changes. After this, we consider a 
sample of ADRs and how dividend reference points fail to translate across currencies. 
B. Main Sample  
Our primary sample of U.S. dividend payments is summarized in Table 1. We obtain 
dividend data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) database. We start with 
all records in the event database with a distribution code (CRSP:DISTCD) equal to 1232. These 
are ordinary taxable dividends paid at a quarterly frequency. We further limit the sample to firms 
with a share code (CRSP:SHRCD) of 10 or 11. This restricts our attention to ordinary common 
shares and eliminates most companies incorporated outside the U.S., Americus Trust 
Components, closed-end funds, and REITs. Such firms have dividend policies that may have 
reference points denominated in non-dollar currencies or have regulatory or contractual 
restrictions on dividend policy. We also eliminate dividend payments of 0, dividend payments 
greater than $2.00 per share, and dividends for which there is no declaration date 
(CRSP:DCLRDT). Otherwise, the entire CRSP database ending in 2009 appears in Table 1. The 
data here start with the beginning of the CRSP file in 1926, but restricting attention to more 
recent periods does not change the economic or statistical conclusions below. 
Our main variable of interest is the raw dividend payment per share. It is easier to think 
about dividend policy as clearing a threshold or creating a new reference point in raw, rather than 
split-adjusted terms. The median dividend payment is $0.195. For changes in dividends, we have 
a choice. We can examine only changes where no split has occurred since the last dividend or we 
can look at split adjusted differences. For the CRSP sample, where quantity of data is not a 
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problem, we look only at pure changes, where no split has occurred. Even with the more 
restrictive definition of pure changes, we have almost 250,000 observations. The majority of 
quarterly dividend changes are zero, and only a small fraction is negative. We also look at 
whether a dividend change clears a threshold of $0.10, $0.05, or $0.025. For the median dividend 
payment, reaching the next $0.10, for example, would require an increase of $0.05. 
We also examine the length of a dividend streak, under the assumption that a longer 
dividend streak ingrains a reference point and makes the market reaction to missing it stronger. 
The median streak in our sample is 4, meaning that the typical dividend decision follows four 
quarters of constant dividends. There is considerable heterogeneity in streaks, with streaks of 
more than 12 quarters being not uncommon.  
To measure the market reaction to a dividend announcement, we compute a three-day 
abnormal stock return around the declaration date. This is the simple return (CRSP:RET) for the 
firm in the day before, the day of, and the day after a dividend declaration minus the return of the 
CRSP value-weighted index over the same window. On average, a dividend declaration is met 
with approximately a 20 basis point abnormal return. The median abnormal return is also zero. 
This is a sample of firms that did not omit a dividend, so a slightly positive average is not 
surprising. We also measure volume over the period from the dividend declaration through three 
days after. We normalize this volume by taking the log difference between the average daily 
declaration date volume and the average daily volume in the previous 90 calendar days.  
C. Round Numbers and Reaching for Thresholds 
Dividends are paid in round numbers. This is apparent in a simple histogram of dividends 
per share in Panel A of Figure 4. A nickel per share is the modal dividend, a dime the second 
most common amount, and a quarter is very nearly the third most common amount. There are 
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notable spikes at other round multiples of $0.05. Panel B shows that the most common values for 
the second and third digits are 0.050, followed by 0.000, and to a much lesser extent 0.025 and 
0.075. Other round multiples of 0.01 are somewhat less common, and non-round values are rare.  
Dividend changes are also made in round numbers. Figure 5 shows dividend changes 
when no split occurs between dividend payments. The most obvious patterns in dividend changes 
match our model in Panels B and C of Figure 2 exactly: the very large mass at exactly zero, a 
discontinuity between negative and positive changes even when the mass point at zero is 
removed, and considerably more clustering just above zero than just below zero. Panel A shows 
the discontinuity at zero. Little else is even perceptible because the density at zero renders the 
rest of the distribution inconsequential. When we remove zero changes in Panel B, clustering just 
to the right of zero is much more apparent. Again, the density above zero is many times the 
density at equivalent changes below zero. When we further split the sample into increases and 
decreases, it is also clear that the left tail of the distribution of dividend cuts in Panel D is longer 
than the right tail of dividend increases in Panel C, as we observed in Panel C of Figure 2. 
Another pattern is the tendency for increases to reach a threshold, presumably 
contributing to the salience of the new level. By threshold, we are referring to the next round 
number in dividends per share. For example, the next $0.10 threshold for a firm paying $0.11 is 
$0.20, the next $0.05 threshold is $0.15, and the next $0.025 threshold is $0.125. We view this as 
somewhat akin to the gap in the distribution in Panel B of Figure 2. To be appreciated for raising 
the dividend, firms must do so in more than a trivial way. 
Figure 6 shows this pattern. When we center the change in dividends—for dividend 
increases only—on one of these thresholds, it is apparent that the modal increase is exactly to the 
next threshold. In each case, we look in the neighborhood of the threshold, within but not 
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including $0.025 above and below the threshold. For example, for the firm that is currently 
paying $0.11, Panel A shows that paying $0.20 is much more likely than paying $0.19 or $0.21. 
Panel B shows the same result around the next $0.05 threshold, and Panel C shows the next 
$0.025 threshold.  
One question is whether this is simply restating the fact from Figure 4 that firms tend to 
pay dividends in round numbers. We also check situations where a firm is not starting at a 
$0.025 threshold in Panels D, E, and F. The same pattern appears. Clearly, boards think of 
communicating dividend policy in an easy to recall dollar per share quantity, rather the 
alternative of deciding on a very specific dollar amount and dividing this equally among 
shareholders. 
D.  Market Reaction 
Figure 7 shows the market reaction to changes in dividends per share. We split the 
sample into increments of $0.05 in Panel A or $0.025 in Panel B around zero change. We round 
down to the nearest threshold, so that a dividend increase of $0.01 is included in the zero 
dividend change group, and a dividend cut of $0.01 is included in the $0.025 cut group. Next, we 
compute the median 3-day abnormal return for each group. The pattern in both Panels is similar. 
Dividend cuts are greeted with a larger negative return than dividend increases of the same 
magnitude. The difference is roughly a factor of two.  In fact, the whole response curve is 
strikingly similar the pattern predicted by the model in Panel D of Figure 2. While the apparent 
concavity is not a direct prediction of the simple model, a more elaborate model of investor 
preferences could in principle deliver this sort of pattern. 
We examine this pattern somewhat more formally in Table 2, where we estimate 
piecewise linear regressions of the market reaction on the change in dividends per share to trace 
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out the patterns in Figure 7 in a regression framework. We are particularly interested in the shift 
in slope below and above zero. The first regression is a simple linear regression. Each $0.01 
change in dividends leads to a 9 basis point market reaction.  
This obscures a highly nonlinear relationship where changes around zero are much more 
important than larger movements. The second, piecewise linear regression shows that small cuts 
in dividends up to $0.025 are greeted with a market reaction of 71 basis points for each $0.01 
change. Small increases in dividends up to $0.025 are greeted with a market reaction of 35 basis 
points, or approximately half the slope that we observe in dividend cuts. There are similarly large 
differences in the next increments, though the reaction per $0.01 of dividend change drops off 
quickly. As a summary test, we compare the sum of the three coefficients between -$0.10 and 
zero to those between zero and +$0.10. The slope for dividend cuts is larger both economically 
and statistically, as one might have guessed from Figure 7. In the final specification, we repeat 
the analysis with a coarser estimation of slopes, combining the slope between cuts or increases of 
less than $0.025 with those that are between $0.025 and $0.05. The conclusions are the same. 
Table 3 provides evidence that dividend cuts do get investors’ attention. The table shows 
that the stronger market reaction comes with stronger volume. We repeat the analysis in Table 2 
but replace the market reaction with abnormal value as the dependent variable. Both dividend 
increases and decreases are associated with higher than normal volume. The negative 
coefficients below zero and the positive ones above zero in the piecewise linear regressions 
suggest a v-shaped pattern around zero dividend change. The coefficients are slightly larger in 
absolute value for cuts than increases, however. In the range from zero to a cut of $0.025, every 
$0.01 cut in dividends is associated with an increase in volume of 667 basis points, or six percent 
more than normal volume. Similar dividend increases are also associated with higher volume but 
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the rate is somewhat smaller at 570 basis points. Once again, the joint test of the differential 
sensitivity of volume to dividend changes above and below zero is statistically strong: The 
market reacts with greater volume following a dividend cut. 
We also look for patterns around threshold dividend changes. Instead of sorting the 
sample around zero dividend change, we sort it around the next $0.10, $0.05, or $0.025 
threshold. This means implicitly that we are capturing both the threshold above and the threshold 
below the current level of dividends in our sorts in Figure 8 and our piecewise linear regressions 
in Table 4, which themselves use threshold breakpoints. Figure 8 shows a similar pattern. 
Changes that do not cross a round number threshold elicit a neutral market reaction, changes that 
cross a threshold from below have a positive reaction similar to that in Figure 7, and changes that 
cross a threshold from above have a slightly stronger negative reaction than in Figure 7. The 
numerical results in Table 4 show this somewhat more clearly. The change in market reaction per 
$0.01 change in dividends below the lower threshold is 100 basis points, versus 71 basis points 
in Table 2. The same comparison for thresholds of $0.05 is 66 basis points versus 57 basis 
points. For dividend increases the differences are smaller at 39 versus 35 basis points, and for a 
$0.05 increase, the effect is actually somewhat smaller at 22 versus 27 basis points. In short, 
threshold effects are important on the downside, suggesting that round number thresholds are 
important reference points.  
Another, and perhaps cleaner, test of reference points is to examine dividend streaks. If 
memory is an important part of reference point formation, then repeated dividends of the same 
amount per share may be stronger reference points. Hence, cutting or raising a dividend after a 
long streak may have stronger market reactions. The basic idea is that long streaks constitute 
stronger reference points, so there should be more clustering and the patterns in Table 2 should 
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be more pronounced as the streak lengthens. We plot clustering around successive streaks in 
Figure 9, examining streaks of length one through 16 separately. We emphasize the general 
rising trend clustering as the streak length increases. The exceptions are intuitive. A large 
number of firms reevaluate their dividend policy only annually, so there is a drop in clustering 
after a streak of 4, 8, 12, and 16. Removing the impact of annual periodicity, the conclusion is 
strengthened. 
Next, we consider the market reaction. We partition the sample into three categories: 
Decisions following a change in the prior quarter; decisions following no change for up to four 
quarters, the periodicity of the typical annual board review of dividend policy; and dividend 
decisions following no change for more than four quarters. Again, we do this analysis once with 
sorts in Figure 10 and once with a piecewise linear regression in Table 5. The results are as 
expected. The no streak sample has essentially no difference between the effect of a $0.01 
decrease and a $0.01 increase in the neighborhood of zero. Meanwhile, the patterns are 
successively stronger for the short and long streak samples.  
For example, consider the long streak sample. The market reaction to dividend cuts is 
stronger than gains, and also stronger than the unconditional coefficients in Table 2 at 93 basis 
points per $0.01 change in dividends just below zero, versus 71 basis points in Table 2. The 
market reaction to a dividend increase is also larger at 52 versus 35 basis points in Table 2, 
despite being half of the reaction to a dividend cut in Table 4. Taken together, these results 
suggest that repetition increases the strength of a reference point. 
E. BP-Amoco: A Case Study 
Our last set of tests involves dividends on American Depository Receipts (ADRs). An 
ADR allows U.S. investors to purchase shares in a company that is incorporated abroad and 
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listed on a foreign exchange, but without executing a transaction on a foreign exchange in a 
different currency. Because of foreign exchange volatility, the dividend policy of a firm with an 
ADR trading in the U.S. is by definition unable to create a reference point in two different 
currencies simultaneously.  
The case of BP-Amoco shown in Figure 11 provides a fascinating demonstration of how 
the reference point is set to appeal to the relevant investor base. In December of 1998, British 
Petroleum acquired Amoco to form BP-Amoco. BP was listed on the London Stock Exchange 
but also traded through an ADR. Panel A shows that prior to the merger, Amoco had increased 
dividends by $0.025 each year for the prior four years. BP had increased dividends by £0.0125 
semiannually for the previous two years. Not surprisingly, the dollar dividend on the ADR was 
hardly so regular.  
The merger required some reconciliation between these two different but equally rigid 
policies. The reconciliation was for BP to now fix dividend increases in dollar terms. Moreover, 
for the several years following the merger, the rate of increase in BP dividends exactly matched 
Amoco’s old rate of increase, amounting to $0.025 each year. The common British policy of 
semiannual payment, however, was retained. Ultimately, dividend policy during the transition 
was managed carefully so as not to upset dollar-dividend reference points that had been created 
for Amoco shareholders over many years, as they now owned a large fraction of BP shares.  
F. ADR Sample 
For a broader analysis, we start with a list of ADRs and matched parents from Datastream 
over the period from 1990 through 2009 described in Table 6. We restrict the sample to firms 
with an ADR traded on the New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, and other U.S. OTC 
exchanges. This gives us a preliminary list of 4,916 Datastream codes for ADRs and their 
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parents. Despite this large initial number of potential firms, the coverage and quality of 
Datastream dividend data is much lower than CRSP, so our tendency in forming a sample is one 
of inclusion rather than restricting attention to the cleanest situations. Some of the parents appear 
more than once, meaning that there is more than one ADR for a given parent firm. We treat these 
as separate observations. 
For these Datastream codes, we gather information on dividends paid per share 
(Datastream:DD) in each month. We restrict attention to the following dividend types 
(Datastream:DT): QTR, HYR, YR, FIN, INT. While we would like to limit attention only to 
quarterly dividends, semi-annual and annual dividends are more common abroad. We also 
include dividends designated as final and intermediate under the assumption that many of these 
are regular dividends during the course of a fiscal year. We exclude a small number of 
observations where an ADR pays a dividend in a foreign currency, despite apparently trading on 
a U.S. exchange, or the parent pays a dividend in U.S. dollars. These are likely data errors. We 
are able to find 19,046 dividends for ADRs and 32,177 dividends for their parents. Given the 
smaller starting quantity of data, we use split adjusted values, so that we can examine changes in 
more cases.  
Our primary interest is whether or not a reference point is created through the payment of 
ADR dividends. When we compute changes, we require that the dividend type be constant from 
one period to the next. Quarterly dividends are reported to be more common in the ADRs in 
Datastream than in their matched parents, for reasons that are not clear, so we lose more data 
when we look for clean changes in the parent sample. The dividend type typically stays the same 
in consecutive records for ADRs, while the dividend type is the same in only 9,196 of 29,211 
consecutive parent records.  
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The dividends per share for the parents are paid in a wide range of currencies, from Yen 
to Euro, so the levels of dividends per share are sometimes an order of magnitude higher. The 
median for ADRs is $0.194. The median dividend payment for the parent sample is 1.2, which 
includes many small dividend payments in more valuable currencies and many large ones in less 
valuable currencies. There is no unambiguous way to put all of these currencies on level terms, 
without losing the essential nature of a reference point analysis, so we leave them in raw terms. 
Our specific tests involve the market reaction around zero dividend changes for ADRs. 
We compute announcement returns for the ADR sample by merging declaration dates from 
Worldscope (Datastream: DECQ1-DECQ4) to Datastream return indexes (Datastream:RI) for 
the five-day window surrounding the declaration date. Dividend payments are matched to 
declaration dates that occur for up to three previous months in an attempt to increase coverage. 
We also use a slightly larger window to capture the lower quality of Worldscope’s declaration 
dates. The average dividend announcement return is approximately 110 basis points, though the 
median is again zero. 
G. A Placebo Test 
We conduct a final test that confirms what is clear in the BP-Amoco case. Namely, that 
zero change in dividends has no special significance for ADRs. In other words, investors do not 
care about dividend cuts per se, rather they care about a cut from a mutually agreed upon 
reference point. Because reference points cannot hold simultaneously in two currencies, ADR 
dividends in most cases freely cross the zero change boundary and the market reaction is 
similarly unremarkable in this range. 
Figure 12 shows the dividend policy of ADRs measured in both dollars and local 
currency. Dividend changes in US dollars are centered on zero change, but the mass point at zero 
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in Panel A is very far from what we saw in Table 1 for the CRSP sample. Moreover the 
asymmetry between dividend cuts and increases is barely apparent in Panel B when we eliminate 
zeros from the sample. By contrast, when measured in local currency, there is a much clearer 
delineation at zero. Non-zero dividend changes are comparatively rare in Panel C, and when we 
exclude zero changes in Panel D, a preference for small increases over decreases is readily 
apparent. It is noteworthy that these effects are less pronounced in the parents-of-ADRs sample 
than in the CRSP sample of Figure 5. Part of this is because we broadened the sample as much as 
possible, perhaps at the cost of including some special or liquidating dividends, and part of this 
may be because the Datastream data is lower quality. 
We examine the market reaction to these changes in Table 7. The first observation is that 
the relationship between dividend changes and the market reaction is everywhere less 
economically and statistically significant. The R-squared drops from 0.0127 to 0.0004. 
Moreover, there is no clear pattern in the neighborhood of zero. The reaction to cuts is on 
average almost the same as the reaction to increases. Together, these results suggest that neither 
ADR boards nor investors view past dividends – paid in dollars – as an important reference 
point. The corollary from this placebo test is that changes in dividend policy are important 
because of an endogenously chosen and acknowledged reference point, not because changes in 
this neighborhood would otherwise have been economically important. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Standard dividend signaling theories posit that executives use dividends to destroy some 
firm value and thereby signal that plenty of value remains. The money burning takes the form of 
tax-inefficient distributions, foregone profitable investment, or costly external finance. The 
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executives who actually set dividend policy overwhelmingly reject these ideas—yet, at the same 
time, are equally adamant that “dividends are a signal” to shareholders and that cutting them has 
negative consequences.  
We develop a more realistic signaling theory. We use core features of the prospect theory 
value function to create a model in which past dividends are reference points against which 
future dividends are judged. The theory is consistent with several important aspects of the data, 
including survey evidence, patterns of market reaction to dividend announcements, and dividend 
smoothing and the Lintner partial-adjustment model. We also find support for its novel 
prediction that dividends are formed in ways that make them memorable and thus stronger 
reference points.  
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